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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from the entry of Amended Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree entered by the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, District Judge, following an
appeal reversal, and remand by this court where the Trial
Court, upon the oral motion of Plaintiff, without prior notice
to Defendants, amended paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact,
contrary to this court's previous opinion, altering the
Defendants7 right to receive culinary water. This Court has
jurisdiction of this appeal under the provisions of Section
78-2-2(3) (i) 1987 and Rule 3A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This action was filed by Cornish Town against Evan 0.
Koller

and Marlene

B. Roller

in

1979

to determine the

ownership of rights-of-way over the Rollers7 land and the
ownership of culinary water used by Cornish and the Rollers
from springs situated on the Roller property.

The case was

tried by the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen on February 16,
17 and 18 of 1983.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and

a Judgment were entered on April 26, 1984.

The Trial Court

determined issues of rights-of-way, ownership of the water and
held that the town had right to determine whether Rollers
should be supplied water from the town's water supply or from
the spring from which Rollers' reservation was made.

1

Defendants perfected an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court
relative to the source of Defendants7 culinary water, damages
and other matters.

Plaintiff cross-appealed challenging the

Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and the
division of the water. The matter was orally argued. On July
20, 1988 the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah rendered its

decision affirming the Trial Court relative to all issues
except the finding of the Trial Court relative to the source
from which the Roller's culinary water must be supplied.
Cornish v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (1988).

See

See Addendum B.

The Supreme Court reversed the Trial Court holding that
the town must comply with the provisions of the Rollers' deed
reserving the water right from the Pearson Spring.

The town

must now provide the Defendants with culinary water from the
Pearson Spring and not other sources of water.

Following the

decision by the Supreme Court, the Defendants

submitted

Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Amended
Judgment consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court.
Defendants also sought to correct clerical errors in the
Judgment.

At the hearing on November 15, 1988, Plaintiff

concurred with the Amended Findings of Fact in accordance with
the decision

of the

Supreme

Court but objected

to the

correction of some clerical errors and submitted written
objections.

2

At the hearing, Counsel for Cornish, without prior notice
to

the

Defendants, orally

moved

the

Court

to

make

an

additional Finding of Fact to be added to the end of paragraph
5 of the Findings of Fact regarding the location of Rollers'
tap

into

the

Cornish

water

line.

The

modification

substantially affected Defendants' right to receive culinary
water.

The Court granted the Plaintiff's oral motion and on

the 15th day of December, 1988, entered Amended Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Amended Judgment incorporating
the substance of Plaintiff's oral motion. Written objections
were made to the amended Finding of Fact incorporating the
modified paragraph.

See Addendum A.

The Trial Court denied

Defendants' motion objecting to the entry of the Amended
Findings of Fact.

Defendants thereafter filed a Notice of

Appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issue presented on appeal is:
(1)

Whether or not the Trial Court procedurally erred

in entertaining the Plaintiff's oral motion to amend a finding
of fact substantially modifying Defendants' water right, where
the motion was made without notice to the Defendants, and was
made more than 4 1/2 years after the entry of the initial
Finding; and
(2) Whether or not the Trial Court substantively erred
in modifying the Findings of Fact made 4 1/2 years earlier.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
14th Amendment U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section
7 Utah Constitution.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE

OF

THE

CASE.

This

is

a

proceeding

supplemental to remand on appeal by Cornish Town to amend the
Findings of Fact signed by the Trial Court on April 26, 1984,
which were subject to an appeal decided by this Court July 20,
1988, and remanded for further proceedings consistant with the
opinion.
II.

A COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BEFORE THE

LOWER COURT.

This case was tried before the Honorable VeNoy

Christoffersen on February 16, 17 and 18 of 1983.

The Court

thereafter entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
a Judgment on April 26, 1984.

The Defendants appealed from

the Judgment of the District Court, relative to Findings
involving the source of Defendants' culinary water supply.
On the 20th day of July, 1988, this Court rendered its
decision affirming the Trial Court relative to all issues
except a finding of the Trial Court that the town may supply
Defendants' water from the town's general water sources.
The

Supreme Court

remanded

the matter back

to the

District Court for "proceedings consistent with the decision."
4

The Defendants submitted Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and an Amended Judgment to the Court consistent with
the decision of the Utah Supreme Court. In addition thereto,
Rollers sought the correction of clerical errors appearing in
the original Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment
and Decree. The Plaintiff submitted written objections to the
correction of the clerical errors.

A hearing was held on the

15th day of November, 1988, in the District Court of Cache
County to resolve the issues brought before the Court by the
submission of Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
a Judgment as evidenced by the Plaintiff's written objections.
During the course of this hearing Plaintiff's Attorney orally
moved to amend Finding of Fact No. 5.

The .motion was made

without notice to the Rollers as required by the Rules.

In

substance, Plaintiff's motion gives Cornish the right to alter
the established point at which the Rollers' tap into the
Cornish water line giving Cornish the option to substantially
modify the culinary water the Rollers reserved.

The Trial

Court granted Plaintiff's oral motion. The Defendants' appeal
from the Court's entertaining the motion and granting the
motion as found in the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

At the time of the initial

trial of this matter on February 16, 17 and 18 of 1983,
Defendants proffered evidence to the Court to the effect that

5

Plaintiff's predecessor in interest were the owners of a
culinary water right from the Pearson Spring as evidenced by
a Deed wherein:
"Grantors reserve the right to use the
water for human drinking and stock
watering purposes.
This use to be
confined to a water flow through a 3/4
inch tap, and Grantee agrees to pipe the
said water to the home of Lars Pearson
for culinary and domestic purposes. All
water to be measured through a culinary
water meter."
Cornish v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, 921 (Utah 1988).

Addendum

The Trial Court in the initial proceeding made and
entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree.
Cornish v. Roller, infra, page 920.

Findings of Fact,

paragraph 5, states as follows:
5. Defendants' predecessor in interest
reserved the right to use water for human
drinking and stock watering purposes.
This flow to be confined to a water flow
through a 3/4 inch tap and Grantees agree
to pipe the said water to • the home of
Lars Pearson, Defendants' predecessor for
culinary and domestic purposes.
All
water to be measured through a culinary
water meter. The tap is
situated approximately 50 feet west of
the Defendants' residence. (Emphasis
ours)
Paragraph 5 contained material recitations relative to
the appeal by Rollers to the Supreme court of the State of
Utah.

It was cited verbatim by the Supreme Court in its

decision dated July 20, 1988.

6

(See page 920)

This Court

affirmed in part the decision of the Trial Court and reversed
the decision of the Trial Court as it relates to Finding of
Fact paragraph 20 which was as follows:
20. The Court finds that the Defendants
are to receive the water that Defendants
are not entitled to say where they
receive it from, and that the source is
not restricted solely to the Pearson
Spring.
The Court finds that the
Defendants are entitled to determine
where the union with the Cornish line
will be located and shall thereafter
provide and pipe through a 3/4 inch tap
to the home of the Defendants7 culinary
water as set forth in the deed.
(Emphasis ours)
The Supreme Court held that since Rollers7 predecessor
in interest did not own the Cornish water system, Rollers7
predecessor in interest could not have reserved to themselves
rights to the water from that system, and, therefore, Rollers
were entitled to have their culinary water right, which was
the subject of a conveyance, flow from the Pearson Spring.
This Court recited but reversed no other Finding of Fact.
See Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988).
Following
submitted

to

the

decision

Plaintiff

Conclusions of Law.

by

Amended

this

Court

Findings

Record p.91-102,

Defendants

of

Fact

and

Paragraph 20 of the

Findings of Facts was amended consistent with the opinion.
Cornish made no objections to that amendment.

(Tr. p. 34.)

Defendants also sought to correct clerical errors made in the
initial Findings of Fact, Judgment and Decree by including
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State Engineer WUC numbers, (Tr. p. 24 to 33) changing dates
of

the

irrigation

records.

season

(Tr. p.26)

to

conform

to

State

Engineer

These issues were heard by the Trial

Court and appropriate corrections of clerical errors were
made by the Court in a hearing on November 15, 1988. At that
hearing the Court had before it written objections which were
properly noticed for hearing.

At that hearing Counsel for

Cornish, without notice to the Rollers and without submitting
a

written

motion,

orally

moved

the

Court

to

make

an

additional Finding of Fact to be added to paragraph 5 of the
Findings of Fact.

(Tr. p. 5 - 22)

Until that time neither

party had appealed from, nor objected to paragraph 5 of the
Findings of Fact.

Over Rollers' objection Cornish proposed

in the oral motion (Tr. p. 5) an amendment as follows to be
added to the end of paragraph 5:
However, as long as Cornish provides the
water through a 3/4 inch tap from the
Pearson Spring that complies with the
deed regardless of where the tap is
located in relation to the residence.
Addendum A.
Counsel

for Cornish

then represented

to the

Court that

Cornish intended to construct a diversion box along Cornish's
main water line and to situate a 3/4 inch tap into the
diversion box from which Rollers7 water would then flow down
(Tr. p. 8) Presently Rollers7

hill to the Roller residence.

tap into the water line 50 feet west of their house is at a
pressure of 100+ psi. (Tr. p. 1 9 - 2 1 )
8

The amendment would

allow Cornish to situate the 3/4 inch restriction (tap) at a
place

where

there

is

zero

pressure,

(Tr.p.20)

thus

dramatically limiting the amount of water Kollers may receive
for culinary purposes. (Tr. p. 9)

The Kollers objected to

the amendment stating that Cornish was obligated to furnish
water to the home of Lars Pearson where the Kollers might
then tap into the line, which tap was situated approximately
50 feet west of the residence.

Cornish admitted that the

intent of the amendment was to further quantify Kollers7
water.

(Tr. p. 2, line 20; Tr. p. 10, lines 16, 17) Cornish

had tried to limit Rollers7 water by prior motions (Record p.
13-14 and 33-34) without success.

The Kollers claimed the

motion was an attempt to retry the case.

(Tr. p. 12)

The

Trial Court, without taking evidence, granted Plaintiff's
Motion to amend paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact.
22)

(Tr. p.

Plaintiff's Counsel incorporated the amendment into

Amended Findings of Fact along with the corrected clerical
errors requested

by Defendants

and the Court thereafter

executed Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (Record
p. 133-144) and an Amended Judgment (Record p. 146-153)
Addendum A.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellants claim that the Trial Court procedurally erred
in entertaining Plaintiff's oral motion to amend a finding of
fact which had been unchanged since April 26, 1984, when the
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original decree was entered.

The motion, by Plaintiff,

without prior notice to the Defendants, (notwithstanding the
fact that it was orally made in the course of the hearing)
fails to comply with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Code of Judicial Administration.

Further, the Trial

Court substantially erred in granting the Plaintiff7s oral
motion as it is apparent that the Plaintiff was using the
motion

as

circumvent
paragraph
quantity

a
the

substitute

for

Supreme

Court's

whereby
of water

the

ruling

the town might
delivered

appellate

be

by

process
amending

able to

to the Roller

to
the

limit the

residence by

changing the location of the Rollers' tap into the Cornish
Town line to a point where the water would flow through the
tap at a substantially reduced pressure thereby limiting
gallonage.
The issue having been decided and not appealed.

The

motion should not have been granted based upon the doctrine
of res judicata and collateral estoppel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
ORAL MOTION TO AMEND FINDING OF FACT NUMBER 5.
Notwithstanding the fact that this case was on appeal
from

the Trial

Court decision

rendered

April

26, 1984,

Plaintiff on July 12, 1988, sought further clarification from
the Trial Court regarding the extent of Rollers' water rights
10

and sought a permanent injunction to have the court establish
a quantifiable limit on the amount of water Rollers could use
from the Pearson Spring.
Court concluded

A hearing was held and the Trial

that it had heard no evidence that the

Defendants were wasting water or unreasonably
water.

using the

Therefore, the Trial Court concluded on August 12,

1988, that there was no necessity of quantifying the amount
of Rollers7 water from the Pearson Spring.
August 30, 1988)

(Memo Decision

In a second instance a water line had been

replaced by the Rollers from Griffiths Spring (not involved
in this case) by Rollers which the town objected to and upon
hearing held August 12, 1988 and November 15, 1988, the Trial
Court again denied Cornish's efforts to limit the water used
by the Rollers.

The oral motion made by Cornish Town on

November 15th to amend paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact
was another attempt on the part of Cornish Town to limit or
quantify waters received by the Rollers under the terms of
their reservation.

(Tr. p. 9, 10)

All other motions,

objections and matters heard by the Court on November 15th
were in writing with notice given to opposing counsel.
The Trial Court erred in entertaining the Plaintiff's
Motion.

Rule

52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

provides as follows:
Findings of Fact, whether based on oral
or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity
11

of the Trial Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Sub-paragraph (b) of the same rule provides as follows:
Upon motion of any party not later than
ten flOl days after the entry of the
judgment the court may amend its findings
of fact to make additional findings or
may amend the judgment accordingly.
(Emphasis added)
The oral motion of Cornish Town fails to comply with
Rule 52 of the URCP since judgment in this case was entered
on April 26, 1984.

The subject matter in Finding number 5

was recited verbatim in the Supreme Court Decision, 758 P.2d
at page 920, and neither party, during the course of the
initial appeal, sought to object to nor amend this Finding of
Fact.

Therefore, under the provisions of Rule 52 the Trial

Court erred in entertaining the Plaintiff's oral motion.
Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure relating
to motions to alter or amend judgments provides that the
motion shall not be made not later than ten (10) days after
the entry of the judgment.

Again, Plaintiff's motion, if

brought under Rule 59(e) was not timely brought before the
Court and the Trial Court had no alternative but to deny the
motion.

Burgess v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).

Article 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration
adopted October, 1988, states as its intent the establishment
of uniform procedures for the filing of motions, supporting
memoranda and documents with the court.
establish

a

uniform

procedure
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for

It also seeks to

insuring

timely

and

adequate notice of matters placed on the law and motion
calendar and set for hearing•

It is therefore obvious that

Plaintiff's oral motion, in the nature of a motion to make an
additional finding or to amend the finding of fact made
pursuant to Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
violates the letter and spirit of Rule 4-501 of the Code of
Judicial Administration.
For the Defendants to argue that the Rollers responded
to the motion and were not prejudiced by the fact that the
motion was made orally cannot justify the motion,
and 19)
been

(Tr. p. 17

Had the Rollers received notice, evidence may have

obtained

to

show

that

the

contemplated

change

of

location of the tap into the line would have a significant
effect upon the culinary water available to the Rollers for
daily household uses and particularly in situations where
water was necessary for fire fighting.
entertaining

the

motion,

deprived

The Trial Court, in

the

Plaintiffs

valuable property right without due process of law.

of

a

Nelson

v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983)
The Defendants having

failed

to receive timely and

adequate notice of the motion by the Plaintiff, were unable
to respond to the motion with the introduction of evidence
showing their detriment.
Nor can Plaintiff use Rule 60(b) to amend the finding.
Rule 60(b) relates to relief from a judgment.

13

Findings No.

5 is not a judgment and therefore Rule 60(b) is not the
proper rule to proceed under.
motion circumvented

Essentially Plaintiff's oral

the court's motion practice

appellate process and is

and the

4 1/2 years late. Young v. Western

Piling & Sheeting, 680 P.2d 394 (Utah 1984); Laub v. South
Central

Utah Telephone Association, 657 P.2d

1303

(Utah

1982) .
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALTERING FINDING OF FACT NO. 5.
The oral motion by the Plaintiff was not made to correct
clerical error.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition .

concedes that fact. Plaintiff's oral motion was made for the
purpose of re-interpreting paragraph 5.
Plaintiff claims in their motion for summary disposition
the issue is not determined in prior proceedings.
the following

conversation

took

place between

counsel at page 18 of the transcript:
Mr. Preston:
...it was the city's
obligation to deliver water down to this
point so that the Pearsons could tap into
the line.
The Court: It is the city's obligation
to provide water off the Pearson Spring
line through a 3/4 inch tap and then pipe
it to the house.
Mr. Preston:
I don't think that's a
reasonable interpretation of the deed.
The Court:

Well I know and I have not

14

However,
court and

Mr, Preston: Why did the Court find that
the tap was 50 feet West of the
residence?
The Court: I guess because you told me that's
where it was.
Mr. Preston:
And everything that you
found in there is in the record
somewhere, that is found in the record.
Mr. Burnett: I am disputing the
in fact there.
The question
significance of that. Does it
can't change it?
I don't see
can't.

tap was
is the
mean we
why we

Mr. Preston: I don't mind them changing
the tap, but what they are doing is
limiting the flow of the water by four
times.
The Court: Are they obligated under this
deed to provide a 3/4 inch tap?
Mr. Preston: That's right... at the home
of Lars Pearson.
The Court: No it doesn't say at the home
of Lars Pearson.
Mr. Preston: Then the Court found before
it was at the home of Lars Pearson. Is
the Court finding somewhere else?
The Court: I am saying that's where you
had the 3/4 inch tap which I guess was a
fact.
Mr. Preston: That's exactly. There was
a 3/4 inch restriction at the home of
Lars Pearson.
Notwithstanding

this

conversation

between

Court and

Counsel, the Trial Court allowed the Plaintiff to amend
Finding of Fact no. 5 to include the following language:
However, as long as Cornish provides the
water through a 3/4 inch tap from the
15

Pearson Springs that complies with the
deed, regardless of where the tap is
located in relation to the residence.
It is obvious from the record that the motion was a
substantive

amendment

substantially

altered

of
the

a

finding

of

Defendants' rights

fact
to

which
receive

culinary water from the Pearson Springs.
Defendants

maintain

presently

(and

have

maintained

throughout the course of these proceedings) that Cornish has
the obligation, under the reservation, to provide water from
the Pearson Spring's main line and to pipe the water to the
Defendants' residence where the Defendants then may tap into
the line with a 3/4 inch tap to provide culinary water to
their residence. The Findings of Fact recited by this Court,
(758 P. 2d at page 919, 920) in its decision, determine that
issue as evidenced by the decision.
Assuming, for the purpose of argument, the Plaintiff's
motion complied with the Rules of Civil Procedure, it is
Defendants' position

that

the

issue of the

location of

Defendants' tap into the city's line is determined by Finding
of Fact No. 5.

The Doctrine of res judicata bars the

Defendants from re-litigating the issue or from altering
substantive rights determined by the court and not timely
appealed from.
Note, that no further evidentiary hearing was had at the
request of the Plaintiff.

Therefore, the Court apparently

16

granted the motion upon facts found by the Court at the trial
in 1983 and recited by the Court in Findings of Fact entered
on April 26, 1984, The Amended Findings of Fact No. 5 is now
inconsistent with the amended Conclusions of Law where the
Court concludes as follows:
The Court further concludes that the Plaintiff,
under such reservation, shall deliver to the
Defendants' residence culinary water for human
drinking and stock watering purposes through
a 3/4 inch tap to the home of the Defendants
for the purposes set forth in the grant and
reservation of the deed.
The only reasonable interpretation of the Conclusion of
Law is as initially found by the Court. See also the Amended
Judgment and Decree paragraph 11:
The reservation of the culinary water
rights set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4
hereof is a water right from the waters
flowing from Pearson Spring.
The
Defendants are entitled to have delivered
to their home culinary water for human
drinking and stock watering purposes
through a 3/4 inch tap (a tap being
defined as a 3/4 inch inside diameter
service connection into a water main or
distribution
line)
at
Defendants'
residence for the purposes set forth in
the reservation including indoor plumbing
and customary residential, culinary,
domestic uses to exclude the use of the
water in a fish pond and crop land
irrigation and related uses.
(Emphasis ours)
Therefore, location of the tap into the line is central
to the obligation of Cornish to deliver water to the home of
the Defendants from the Pearson Spring.

17

Cornish argues in their answer to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Disposition that the issue is open for decision on
remand, arguing that the deed is silent as to the location of
the

tap

and

should

interpretation.

now

be

the

subject

of

further

The Defendants resist the argument for

the following reasons:
(1)

The Trial Court in 1984 determined the point

at which the Rollers tapped into the city's line
which was situated

50 feet west of the Roller

residence.
(2)

This finding was incorporated in paragraph 5

of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
(3) The Findings, Conclusions and Judgment relating
to the place where the Rollers tapped into the line
was not the subject of an appeal nor was the subject
of an objection timely filed by the Plaintiff and
as such is now res judicata.
This court in its prior decision recited the Findings of
Fact as an integral part of the factual background for making
its determination that the Rollers' reservation in the deed
obligates Cornish to supply water to the Rollers from the
Pearson Spring and to pipe the same to their residence where
the Rollers may then tap into that line with a 3/4 inch
service connection leading to their house.
A.

The doctrine of res judicata bars the amendment.
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The recent case of Swainston v. Intermountain Health
Care, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. p. 25, this court has said as follows:
There are two branches of res ad judicata,
claim preclusion and issue preclusion.
Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah
1988).
We first consider whether this
appeal involves a claim or an issue. An
issue may be described as a "certain and
material point, affirmed by one party and
denied by the other."
Donahue v.
Susquehanna Collieries Co. . 138 F.2d 3,
4 (ed Cir. 1943). A court resolves an
issue by making a finding of fact or a
ruling on a matter of law. No relief is
inherent in the resolution of an issue.
The Swainston case holds that a factual finding is an
issue.

In Cornish v. Roller, 758 P. 2d 919 (Utah 1988) this

court found issues relating to the facts set forth in Finding
No. 5.

The Swainston case defines a 3 prong test for

preclusion of issues as follows:
(1) Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question?
The answer is clearly in the affirmative as the issue as
to where the tap was located, both logically and factually
was found to be at the house of Defendants, rather than
situated in the middle of a distribution line, the town now
proposes.
(2) Was there a final judgment on the
merits?
The decree of the District Court dated April 26, 1984,
was, in fact, a final judgment on the merits.
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Finding No. 5

was incorporated in the appeal process but was not the subject
of a claimed error.
(3) Was the party against whom the plea
is asserted a party or in privity with
the party to the prior action?
The answer is yes.

All parties are the same.

(4)
Was the issue in the first case
fully, completely and fairly litigated?
The Defendants assert that the matter was in fact fully,
fairly and competently litigated.

Evidence was taken and the

case was tried over the course of three days.

Almost one

year was taken for the Trial Court to enter Findings of Fact.
See also Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387
(Court of Appeals); Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689,
691 (Utah 1978); Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13
(December 12, 1988); White Pine Ranches v. Osguthorpe, 731
P.2d 1076 (Utah 1986); Schaer v. State ex rel. Utah Dep't of
Transp., 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983).
It is obvious that the reason a decision on the part of
Cornish to change the 3/4 inch tap from the residence of
Defendants

to

a

point

on

the

brow

of

the

hill

above

Defendants' house is their recent reinterpretation of an old
finding designed solely for the purpose of attempting to
restrict Defendants7 culinary water supply.
The last paragraph of this Court's decision in the case
of Cornish v. Rollerf infra stated that the case was remanded
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to the Trial Court for proceedings "consistent" with the
opinion.

The

proceedings

of

the Trial

Court were not

consistent with this Court's opinion. See the case of Joseph
Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F. 2d 1437 (5th
Circuit Court of Appeals):
Under the law of the case doctrine both
the District Court and the Court of
Appeals generally are bound by findings
of fact and conclusions of law made by
the Court of Appeals in a prior appeal of
the same case.... however, the law of the
case doctrine does not apply to bar
reconsideration of an issue when (1) a
subsequent trial produces substantially
different
evidence,
(2) controlling
authority
has since made a contrary decision of law
applicable to that issue, or (3) the
prior decision was clearly erroneous and
would work a manifest in justice.
The Court went on to reiterate that the law of the case
doctrine protects against the agitation of settled issues and
assures

obedience

appellate courts.
Trial

of

lower

courts

to

the

decision

of

The appellate court concluded that the

Court exceeded

its authority

on remand

since its

opinion was inconsistent with the initial Wheeler decision
and

the

Trial

Court

established therein.

disregarded

the

law

of

the

case

Similarly the District Court of Cache

County exceed its authority on remand in amending a finding
inconsistent with the balance of the facts and conclusions.
The

District

Court

of

Cache

County

did

not

conduct

a

subsequent trial producing substantially different evidence
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nor has the controlling authority changed nor does the prior
decision clearly work a manifest injustice on either party.
The remand in this case was neither a general reversal
as found in Hutchins v. State of Idaho, 603 P.2d 995 (Idaho
1979) nor does it deal with an issue not passed upon by the
appellate court as suggested in Blinzer v. Andrews, 519 P.2d
483 (Idaho 1973); Hulihee v. Heirs of Hueu. 556 P.2d 920
(Hawaii 1976).
If Rollers7 motion to correct clerical

errors were

substantive modifications they too should have been denied as
such.

It is obvious that the Plaintiff's oral motion to

amend was substantive and should have also been denied.
Neither party has the right to claim that because the other
party attempted a substantive modification of the decree that
justifies the other party making substantive modifications.
CONCLUSION
At

some point

in this

litigation

there must be a

conclusion of the proceedings. Hidden Meadows Development v.
Mills, 590 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1979) at page 1249.

The doctrine

of Res Judicata stands exactly for that proposition.
Moore's Federal Practice, 186)

(IB

The present point at which

Rollers tap into the Cornish water line, 50 feet west of the
Roller residence, has been in place since 1938.

That fact

was embodied in Findings of Fact entered by the District
Court in 1984, recited by this Court in 1988.
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The fact was

not only necessary as an interpretation of the deed, but as
a finding of fact which was a predicate to a determination by
the Supreme Court.
The District Court of Cache County erred in entertaining
an oral motion by Cornish Town in violation of established
case law and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court

compounded that error in granting Plaintiffs motion thus
substantively amending a finding of fact now inconsistent
with the conclusions of law and Decree and in violation of
this Court's remand order where this Court remanded the case
to the District Court for proceeding consistent with the
opinion.
Defendants request this Court reverse the District Court
of Cache County, strike the last sentence of paragraph 5 of
the Amended Findings of Fact and enter the Amended Findings
of Fact, Conclusion^ of Law, Judgment and Decree as written.
„,
,
S
i
DATED this lf
day of Ma/, 1989.

W. Pres€on
PRESTON & CHAMBERS
M. Byron Fisher
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section
8, Township 14 North of Range One West of the Salt
Lake Meridian, which said water is now being used and
has been used for more than forty years on West half
of the Southeast quarter of Section 8, Township 14
North of Range One West of the Salt Lake Meridian.
Together with a right of way over the land of the
grantors including an easement for travel and the
right to construct, operate and maintain water pipe
lines with all accessories thereto, to carry said
water from spring to reservoir over the land described
as follows:
A 20 foot right of way over the Southeast quarter of
Section 8, and the Northeast quarter of Section 17,
Township 14 North, Range One West of the Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
Grantors reserve the right to use water for human
drinking and stock watering purposes. This use to be
confined to a water flow through a 3/4" tap, and
grantee agrees to pipe the said water to the home of
Lars Pearson for culinary and domestic purposes. All
water to be measured through a culinary meter.
5.

Defendants' Predecessor in interest reserved the right

to use water for human drinking and stock watering purposes.
This use to be confined to a water flow through a 3/4 inch tap
and Grantees (Cornish) agreed to pipe the said water to the
home of Lars Pearson, Defendants' predecessor, for culinary and
domestic purposes.
water meter.

All water to be measured through a culinary

The tap is presently situated approximately 50

feet West of the Defendants' residence.

However, as long as

Cornish provides the water through a 3/4 inch tap from the
Pearson Spring, that complies with the deed, regardless of
where the tap is located in relation to the residence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

Cornish Town, a Utah municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,

No. 19981

F I L E D
J u l y 2 0 , 1988

V.

Evan O. Koller and Marlene B.
Koller, husband and wife,
Defendants, Appellants,
and Cross-Appellees.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

First District, Cache County
The Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen
Attorneys:

George W. Preston, Logan, for Appellants
Reed L. Martineau, Jody K. Burnett, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

HALL, Chief Justice:

Corjuj.©n xwwii v varnish") initiated this action after
a dispute arose over certain water rights and rights of way,
Kollers counterclaimed for expenses associated with installing
a waterline between Pearson Spring and their home. The case
was tried to the court, without a jury. Thereafter, the
court, ruling from the bench, entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law providing in pertinent part:
•ci"rvrT>-rvjY"«c: r*T?

r»*r*m

3. The Defendants are the owners of
real property surrounding the Pearson
Spring . • • and presently receive water
for culinary and domestic purposes at
their home through a private water line
which is connected to the Plaintiff's line
that carries water from the Pearson Spring
to the Plaintiff's reservoir and treatment
facilities.
4. That by deed . . . [certain named
parties, including Defendants' predecessor

in interest] conveyed to Cornish Town
[among other things, certain water rights].
5. Defendants['] Predecessor in
interest reserved the right to use water
for human drinking and stock watering
purposes. This use to be confined to a
water flow through a 3/4 inch tap and
Grantees (Cornish) agreed to pipe the
said water to the home of Lars Pearson,
Defendants^] predecessor, for culinary
and domestic purposes. All water to be
measured through a culinary water meter.
The tap is situated approximately 50
feet West of the Defendants' residence.
6. That the Defendants acquired the
right, title and interest . . . as it
relates to the water right to be used
through the 3/4 inch tap.
7. That Emma Marie Pearson Dobbs,
the owner of an undivided one-fifth
interest in and to the Spring set
forth above, did not convey her interest
to Cornish Town, but by deed conveyed
such water rights and real property to
the Defendants herein as set forth in a
deed . . . .

13. The Court finds from the
testimony of the witnesses that Cornish
Town has not be [sic] reason of the nature
of its improvements in the Pearson Spring
Basin area, effectively controlled and
appropriated all of the water coming from
the Pearson Spring area.
14. The Pearson Spring water flowing
down Butler Hollow has been beneficially
used by the Pearsons and their successors
the Rollers.
15. That Plaintiff's evidence has
failed to show a five-year period of
non-use from the Pearson Spring.
16. That the Defendants are the
owners of 1/5 interest in the Pearson
Spring to cover the irrigation period from

April 1st to September 30th, together with
year round stock watering rights as set
forth in the Kimball Decree . • . .
17. That Defendants have the right
to have their share of water from Pearson
Spring flow into Butler Hollow during the
irrigation period as described above and
for stock watering.
18. That the Defendants are the
owners of the rights to culinary water
from the Pearson Spring as set forth
in the quit claim deed from Emma Pearson
....
By reason thereof the Defendants
are not an appropriator of the water and
Defendants' rights are fixed by the grant
in the deed to Emma Pearson, et al[.] and
her successors in interest . . . .

20. The Court finds that the
Defendants are entitled to receive the
water but that Defendants are not entitled
to say where they receive it from, and
that the source is not restricted solely
to the Pearson Spring. The Court finds
that the Plaintiff is entitled to determine where the union with the Cornish line
will be located and shall thereafter provide and pipe through a 3/4 inch tap to
the home of the Defendants, culinary water
as set forth in the deed.
21. The Court finds that the Pearson
Spring water supply is not one single
spring, but may be composed of several
22. That Defendants' Counterclaim
for damages for the installation of a
pipeline is hereby denied.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

3. That judgment should enter
decreeing that the Defendants are the
owners of a right to a one-fifth in

Pearson Spring to cover the irrigation
period from April 1st to September 30th
of each year and for stock watering and
domestic purposes as adjudicated in the
Kimball Decree to flow down Butler Hollow.
4. That Defendants are not an
appropriator of the tap water from the
Cornish Municipal water system, but are
the owners of a right to culinary water
as evidenced by a grant in a deed • . .
from Emma Pearson . . . .
5. The Court concludes that the
grant of the water right is not restricted
solely to the source of water of Pearson
Spring. The Court further concludes that
the Plaintiff is entitled to determine
where the union will be with the Cornish
line and to provide and pipe through a 3/4
inch tap to the home of Defendants for the
purposes set forth in the grant.
6. That Defendants are not entitled
to prevail on Defendants' Counterclaim.
Judgment was entered in accordance with these findings, and the
parties brought their respective appeals.
II
Rollers first argue on appeal that the trial court
erred by finding that Cornish had the right to determine the
point of connection of Rollers' culinary waterline with the
Cornish water system. They claim their right to receive
culinary water arises from a reservation in a deed given by
Rollers' predecessors in interest (Pearsons) to Cornish wherein
water rights in and to "one certain unnamed spring," now known
as the Pearson Spring, were conveyed. Accordingly, Rollers
contend that they are entitled to receive their water from the
Pearson Spring and not Cornish's general culinary water supply.
Cornish responds that the deed is silent concerning the location of the tap with the point of connection to Cornish's water
system.
The deed, wherein several members of the Pearson
family granted "[a]11 the right, title and interest . . . in
all water and water rights in and to one certain unnamed
spring," which is now known as Pearson Spring, contains the
following provision:
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Grantors reserve the right to use
water for human drinking and stock-watering
purposes.. This use to be confined to a
water flow through a 3/4" tap, and grantee
agrees to pipe the said water to the home
of Lars Pearson, for culinary and domestic
purposes. All water to be measured
through a culinary meter.
Resolution of this first issue requires construction of the
grant. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1980) provides that water
rights shall be transferred by deed in substantially the same
manner as real estate, with an exception which is not relevant
here. Accordingly, the rules governing the construction of
deeds generally apply when construing an instrument conveying
water rights.1 The primary rule regarding construction of
deeds is to give effect to the intentions of the parties as
expressed in the deed as a whole.2 In this regard, we have
stated that in the absence of ambiguity, the construction of
a deed is a question of law for the court.3 In such a case,
we are not bound by the trial court's determination of the
meajiing of the writing.4
In the instant case, the trial court concluded that
Kollers' water right under the deed was not restricted "solely
to the source of water of Pearson Spring." However, the plain
language of the deed indicates that the grantors "reserved" in
themselves the water rights indicated. By its very nature, a
"reservation" is a clause in a deed or other instrument of conveyance by which the grantor creates and reserves to himself
some right, interest, or profit relative to the estate granted.
Ownership is one of the conditions which must exist as the
basis of a valid reservation.5 Since Rollers' predecessors in
interest, the Pearsons, did not own the Cornish water system,
the Pearsons could not have "reserved" to themselves rights to
water from that system. Indeed, Cornish's brief appears to
indicate that its water system was net even built at the time
of the conveyance. Instead, the Pearsons must have "reserved"
in themselves rights in the water which was the subject of the
conveyance, namely, the water flowing from Pearson Spring.
1. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-10 (1980); see also 93 C.J.S.
Waters § 190, at 986 (1956).
2. Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1982);
Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979).
3. Hartman, 596 P.2d at 656.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 656-57.

In view of this analysis, the arguments advanced by
Cornish are unavailing. If Cornish did not desire to supply
water under the deed from a specific source of water, it
should not have accepted a deed containing this reservation.
Accordingly, we find Rollers' first point to have merit,
requiring a partial reversal of the judgment in this case.
Ill
Rollers' next point is that the trial court erred
by finding that the "Pearson Spring water supply is not one
single spring, but may be composed of several springs."
Rollers' argument fails for several reasons. First, review of
findings of fact is controlled by rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. To mount a successful challenge to trial
court findings under that rule, an appellant must marshall the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Only then can
we determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous.
Because Rollers have failed to make such a showing in this
case, the trial court's determination will not be disturbed.6
Second, Rollers have failed to provide the Court with
the entire transcript of the proceedings below. This Court
has repeatedly held that an appellant may not succeed on a
claim of error when relevant portions of the record are not
before us; in such a case, the proceedings before the trial
court are presumed to support the trial court's findings.7
For the above reasons, we find Rollers' second point to be
without merit.
IV
Rollers' third point is that the trial court erred
by dismissing their counterclaim. The trial court determined
that Rollers were not entitled to recover on their counterclaim, which was brought to capture the cost of installing a
new pipeline. Rollers installed the pipeline atter Cornish
advised them that it had no responsibility to replace the
line. In ruling on the counterclaim from the bench, the trial
court stated:
6. See Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1301
(Utah 1987) .
7. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 498, 498 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam); Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1984); see
In re Cluff's Estate, 587 P.2d 128, 128 n.l (Utah 1978); see
also Union Bldg. Materials Corp. v. Rakaako, 5 Haw.- App.
146,
, 682 P.2d 82, 86-88 (1984), reconsideration granted,
5 Haw. App. 683, 753 P.2d 253.
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As to the damages, there is testimony
and I feel that under this Cornish was
obligated to provide the water as
previously stated and in the deed.
There's testimony that they were not
doing so, there's testimony that they
refused to do anything about it. Now I
feel that Mr. Roller had the right then
to go see about his water pressure. And
he testified that when he opened it up
he found it full, the T, full of debris,
roots, clogging his water. And I feel
that he would have a right to replace
that and put it in the proper shape to
get his pressure. There's no evidence
there's anything wrong with the rest of
the line. I just think he went too far.
This doesn't give him a right to design
his own water system, change its location, when he could make his own remedy
and would be required I think and could
charge the bill to correct the problem
at the place where it came out of the T,
and that's the only evidence we have that
there was anything wrong with it. There
isn't any evidence there was anything
wrong with the line going all the way
down to the house so he could put in his
other one.
[Defense Counsel]: There was evidence
that the bottom of the line was also
filled up and its size was becoming
smaller than the restriction.
THE COURT: I know, but there is no
evidence that you couldn't have—that
you had to replace this whole line, put
in a different place with four-inch pipe
or even replace the whole line. All that
line that's left there under the ground,
you might still be able, if you get a
proper connection on it, will work fine.
I just say that on the Counterclaim you
failed to convince me by the preponderance
of the evidence that all of that was
necessary. I'm convinced by the preponderance of the evidence there was
something needed to be done up to where
the water came out of that piece that you
got in evidence, but that's about as far
as I say your proof went.
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Now if you have a specific bill on
that portion of it I'll grant judgment
for that. But I didn't peruse those bills
enough to pick that out. But not the
whole line from where you change direction
and go all the way down the hill.
Rollers have not drawn the Court's attention to any evidence on
this issue contradicting the trial court's perception thereon.
Therefore, we find this point of Kollers' appeal to be without
merit.
V
Finally, Cornish in its cross-appeal contends that the
trial court erred in failing to clarify the respective seasonal
water rights of the parties and in concluding that Kollers held
a one-fifth interest in the Pearson Spring. As support for
these claims, Cornish argues that Kollers and their predecessors forfeited the disputed water right by the absence of any
beneficial use thereof. Also, Cornish contends that Kollers
should be equitably estopped from claiming the one-fifth
interest by virtue of acquiescence to Cornish's use of all the
Pearson Spring water in the town's construction and ongoing
maintenance of its municipal waterworks. We disagree.
Again, the designated record on appeal contains only a
partial transcript of the proceedings involved.8 Therefore, we
are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must presume
that the trial court's ruling was founded upon admissible,
competent, and substantial evidence.9
Furthermore, Cornish's claims appear predicated on our
acceptance of its version of the testimony which was given and
how the trial court should have perceived the circumstances as
they existed. However, the facts Cornish advances in support
of its arguments are chosen to the exclusion of other evidence
in the partial record we have before us supporting the lower
court's decision. Due to the trial court's advantaged position,
the presumptions favor its judgment.10 Where there is dispute
and disagreement in the evidence, we assume that the trial court
believed those aspects and fairly drew the inferences to be
derived therefrom which gave its decision support.11 To this
end, the trial court did not find credible the evidence and
8. See R. Utah S. Ct. 11(e)(2).
9. Id.; see also Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763, 764-65 (Utah
1985) (per curiam).
10. Redevelopment Agency, 740 P.2d at 1301-02.
11. Id.
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testimony Cornish presented. Instead, the court viewed the
evidence as supporting the determination that Kollers maintained a one-fifth interest in the water from Pearson Spring
and that the watering period runs as specified* Given the
record before us and the facts of this case, these determinations do not merit reversal herein*
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the trial
court is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case is
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each
party to bear its own costs.

WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Howe, Associate
Chief Justice

I. Daniel Stewart, Justice

Christine M. Durham, Justice

Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
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